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Siegel: Siegel: Is Arbitration Final & (and) Binding

Is Arbitration Final & Binding?
Public Policy Says, "Not
Necessarily!"
Exxon Shipping Company v. Exxon Seamen's Union'

1. INTRODUCTION

In the realm of employment law, management and labor unions enter in
collective bargaining agreements to establish employment terms including wages,
hours, benefits and grievanceprocedures.' A typical grievanceprocedureprovides
that labor disputes will be resolved through arbitration.3 Courts are encouraged
to defer to collective bargaining agreements. 4 When disputes arise, employees
and employers attempt to resolve matters themselves, and if this fails, labor unions
intervene and submit grievances to arbitration.5 Generally, an arbitrator's decision
is final and binding, but in limited circumstances the matter is ultimately
litigated.6 One such limited circumstance arose when the courts developed a
public policy exception to arbitration awards.7 Over the past decade, the circuits
have disagreed about the proper application of the public policy exception. 8
Exxon Shipping II is a prime example of one of the two competing views on when
to apply this exception.9
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Exxon Shipping Company ("Exxon Shipping") brought this action seeking to
have an arbitration award vacated.' 0 A majority of a three-member arbitration
panel ruled against Exxon Shipping in favor of Exxon Seamen's Union
("Union").''

1. 11 F.3d 1189 (3d Cir. 1993). This case will be referred to as Exxon Shipping II because
of a prior, unrelated case between the same parties. See infra note 118.
2. Laurie A. Tribble, Vacating Arbitrator'sAwards Under the Public Policy Exception: Are
Courts Second-Guessing Arbitrators' Decisions?, 38 VILL. L. REv. 1051, 1051 n.1 (1993).
Id.
3.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1059.
8.
Deanna J. Mouser, Analysis of Public Policy Exception after Paperworkersv. Misco: A
Proposal to Limit the Public Policy Exception and to Allow the Parties to Submit the Public Policy
Question to the Arbitrator, 12 INDUs. REL. L. J. 89, 99 (1990).
9. Exxon Shipping I, 11 F.3d at 1194.
10. Id. at 1191. This action originated in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey. Id.
11.
Id.; see infra note 23.
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The dispute stemmed from an incident that occurred on September 13,
1989.12 In 1985, Exxon Shipping and the Union entered into a collective
bargaining agreement requiring all grievances to be submitted to arbitration. 3
Additionally, disputes were to be resolved by an arbitration panel, with the panel's
decision being final and binding. 4 In April 1988, the agreement was modified
by adding a new employee alcohol and drug use policy which provided that
employees under the influence of alcohol or drugs during working hours would be
subjected to discipline, and such conduct would be grounds for termination. 5
On September 5, 1989, the alcohol and drug use policy was modified by a new
provision which gave Exxon Shipping the right to administer a breathalyzer test
to any employee suspected of being intoxicated. 6 Furthermore, it provided that
a Blood Alcohol Content ("BAC") of 0.04 or greater was grounds for discipline
and possibly termination.
In 1989, Randall Fris, an Exxon Shipping employee, was on assignment to
the Exxon Long Beach, an Exxon ship used for the transportation of crude oil. 8
Upon reporting to the Exxon Long Beach on September 13, 1989, several officers
observed that Fris appeared intoxicated. 9 Fris was tested pursuant to the new
policy, and the results revealed he had a BAC of 0.15.20 Exxon Shipping
terminated Fris the next day. 2'
The Union filed a grievance concerning Fris' discharge, and the dispute was
then submitted to arbitration pursuant the collective bargaining agreement.2 2 The
three-member arbitration panel ordered Fris to be reinstated with Exxon Shipping
because termination was not mandatory and Fris had a clean record during eight
years of employment, causing the majority to believe that termination was an

12.

Id. at 1190.

13.

Id.

14.

Id.

15. Id. The policy also provided that if an employee suffering from alcohol or drug dependency
sought treatment, the employee would not be terminated or disciplined. Id. In September 1988, the
company sent a letter to all affected employees explaining the policy. Id. at 1190. The letter also
stated that these incidents would be handled on a case-by-case basis following thorough investigations.
Id.
16.
Id.
17. Id. Blood Alcohol Content is a measure of the intoxication level determined by the
breathalyzer test. THE SLOANE-DORLAND ANNOTATED MEDICAL-LEGAL DICTIONARY 713-14 (1987).
This regulation is consistent with standard Coast Guard Regulations. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 95.020(b),
95.050(b) (1993).
18. Exxon Shipping , 11 F.3d at 1190. Fris' assignment included significant duties in which
he had to exercise judgment and discretion to ensure safe operation of the oil tanker. Id. at 1191. Fris,
employed as an able bodied seaman, was partly responsible for steering the tanker. Exxon Shipping
Co. v. Exxon Seaman's Union, 801 F. Supp. 1379, 1381 (D. N.J. 1992) ("Exxon Shipping").
19. Excon Shipping i,,
11 F.3d at 1190.
20. Id. at 1191.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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inappropriate remedy.23 The majority stated that Fris should have been permitted
to prove that the incident was an aberration and would not be repeated.24 Rather
the majority imposed a 90-day suspension as an adequate
than termination,
5
penalty.
Exxon Shipping then filed this action in district court seeking to have the
arbitration award vacated.26 The company argued that such reinstatement was
contrary to public policy in that there is a significant interest in protecting the
public and the environment from potential disaster resulting from a commercial
vessel operator working while under the influence of drugs or alcohol." The
Union's position was that the arbitration result should be upheld pursuant to the
collective bargaining agreement's provision that arbitration shall be final and
binding.28 The district court concurred with Exxon Shipping's public policy
argument and vacated the arbitration award.29
The Union then appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.30 The court
affirmed the lower court's decision by ruling in favor of Exxon Shipping.3 The
court held that the arbitration award violated a well-defined and dominant public
policy in that the public has a compelling interest in not being subjected to the
potential danger presented from an intoxicated individual operating a commercial
vessel.32 Therefore, the individual's employer is free to discharge the employee
due to such conduct despite the results of the arbitration.33

23. Id. The arbitration panel was made up of a neutral arbitrator, an Exxon Shipping
representative and a Union representative. Id. The majority, consisting of the neutral arbitrator and
the Union representative, reasoned that Exxon Shipping did not terminate Fris for good cause (even
though they agreed that Fris was intoxicated while on duty). Id.
24.

Id.

25.

Id. However, the panel did not require Fris to seek treatment or counseling. Id.

26. Exxon Shipping, 801 F. Supp. at 1382.
27. Id. at 1382, 1389.
28. Id. at 1382. The Union argued that the arbitration award did not violate public policy.
Hence, it should be enforced because Fris did not have a history of alcohol abuse, the 90-day
suspension was a sufficient penalty and termination was not mandatory. Id.
29. Id.at 1392.
30.

Exxon Shipping II, II F.3d at 1191.

31.
32.
33.

Id. at 1194.
Id.
Id.
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LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. JudiciaryDeference to Arbitration

The development of modern day labor law, including the use of arbitration,
has been in full force for approximately the last thirty-five years.14 During this
time, the United States Supreme Court has expressed significant limitations on the
judicial review of arbitration awards under collective bargaining agreements."
There exists significant federal policy favoring settlement of labor disputes

through arbitration, without resorting to the judiciary. 6 The United States
Supreme Court has recognized that a collective bargaining agreement is a distinct
type of contract in that "it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which
the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate."37 The Court stated that an arbitration
award must be enforced unless the decision does not "draw its essence from the
collective bargaining agreement."38 Although the "essence" test is difficult to
define, case law has interpreted it to mean that if the award is rationally related
to the agreement, it shall be enforced.39
An important reason for this great judicial deference is that the arbitrator
possesses specialized knowledge of industrial relations.4" Furthermore, the parties
voluntarily entered into the collectivebargaining agreement which expressly defers
grievances to arbitration.4

34. See generally United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
35.
See United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36-38 (1987),
aff'g Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), aff'g United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. 574 (1960), aff'g United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564 (1960); AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649-50 (1986);
see also Tribble, supra note 2, at 1054.
36. Atisco, 484 U.S. at 36-37; see Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 598. "The federal policy of
settling labor disputes by arbitration would be undermined if the courts had the final say on the merits
of the awards." Id.
37. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 578. This statement indicates that the Court
understood that collective bargaining agreements are drafted to cover all employment situations,
including negligent and wrongful behavior of employees that may or may not have anything to do with
employment responsibilities. Id.
38. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 858 F.2d 427, 429 (8th Cir. 1988); see also Union Pac. R.R. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89,
91 (1978) (noting that labor arbitration awards shall be given the most narrow standard of judicial
review).
39. Id.; Tribble, supra note 2, at 1058; see, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am.,
768 F.2d 180, 186 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1010 (1986); Drummond Coal Co. v. UMW
Dist. 20, 748 F.2d 1498 (1 th Cir. 1984); Board of R.R. Trainmen v. Central Ga. Ry., 415 F.2d 403,
412 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1008 (1978).
40. Mouser, supra note 8, at 93. The chosen arbitrator is an expert, whereas judges are not;
therefore, the arbitrator is more competent to justly resolve labor disputes. Id.
41. Id. at 95.
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B. The Public Policy Exception

Courts have acknowledged that in extraordinary situations judicial review of
an arbitration award is imperative to further the aims of public policy.42 In 1945,
the United States Supreme Court first applied a public policy exception to a
commercial contract by holding that a contract will be invalidated if it violates a
well-defined and dominant public policy. 43 The Court went on to say that the
public policy in question must be "ascertained by reference to the laws and legal
44
precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests."
The United States Supreme Court first adopted the public policy exception
in the labor arbitration area in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759,
45
In W.R. Grace, the
International Union of the United Rubber Workers.
Rights Act of 196446
Civil
the
of
VII
Title
violating
of
employer was suspected
47
As a result, the
by discriminating against African-Americans and women.
employer entered into a conciliation agreement with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). 48 The conciliation agreement resulted in
male employees being treated contrary to the seniority provision in the collective
49
The
bargaining agreement between W.R. Grace and the employees' union.
aggrieved male employees submitted grievances pursuant the collectivebargaining
agreement which required arbitration.5"
Refusing to arbitrate, the employer took the dispute to district court where
5
it argued that the conciliation agreement controlled and should bind the parties.
The District Court agreed, but the decision was reversed on appeal and compelled
the employer to arbitrate.52 The arbitrator determined that the employer was

42.

Tribble, supra note 2, at 1059.

Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945). A contingent fee contract was in
43.
dispute where the contingency was securing a Government contract. Id. at 64. It was unsuccessfully
argued that this type of contract violated public policy in that it would "induce improper solicitation
of public officers and the exercise of political pressure." Id.

44.

Id.; see, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of the United Rubber

Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766-67 (1983) (stating that obedience to judicial orders satisfies the Muschany

test in determining important public policy).
W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 757 (stating that "a court may not enforce a collective bargaining
45.
agreement that is contrary to public policy.").
46.

42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1988 & Supp. V. 1993).

47.
48.

W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 759.
Id.

49.

Id. at 760. W.R. Grace assigned women to positions ahead of male employees with greater

seniority. Id. Due to pending litigation, W.R. Grace laid off certain male employees so as not to
violate the conciliation agreement. Id. These employees added their claims to the grievances already

being handled. Id. at 762.
50.

Id. at 761.

51.

Id

52.

Id. at 761-62.

The court of appeals held that since the seniority system itself was not

discriminatory, it could not be modified without the Union's approval. Id. at 762; see generally
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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liable for violating the collective bargaining agreement's provision regarding
seniority. 3
Instead of following the arbitration award, W.R. Grace went back to district
court in an attempt to have the arbitration award overturned under the theory that
public policy should have prevented the court of appeals from reversing the prior
judicial order.5 4 The case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court
where the public policy exception was applied to the labor dispute." The Court
applied the Muschany public policy exception to the collective bargaining
agreement. 56 The Court acknowledged that there was an important public policy
at issue, "obedience to judicial orders," which satisfied the well-defined and
dominant public policy prong of the test.57 However, the Court held that the
arbitrator's award did not violate the public policy because the award was based
on the employer's violation of the collective bargaining agreement.58 In other
words, the fact that a judicial order was disobeyed was collateral to the
determination that the collective bargaining agreement was violated." Since
W.R. Grace, appellate courts have interpreted the public policy exception with two
distinct approaches.6' One interpretation, the broader application, considers
whether or not the employee's wrongful act violates a well-defined and dominant
public policy. 6 The competing interpretation, a more narrow approach, focuses
on whether the arbitrator's award actually violates public policy.62
The First Circuit adopted the broad interpretation of the public policy
exception in 1984.63 In United States Postal Service v. American Postal
Workers,64 a postal worker was discharged for embezzling postal funds.65 The
American Postal Workers Union disputed the discharge on the grounds that the

53.

W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 764.

54.

Id.

55.
56.

Id.
Id. at 766; see supranotes 43-44.

57.

Id.

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Mouser, supra note 8, at 99.
61.
W.R.Grace, 461 U.S. at 766; see Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 3 F.3d 255
(8th Cir. 1993) (affirming the Eighth Circuit's broad interpretation in that the public policy exception
applies if reinstating an employee poses a risk to the public because of the employee's propensity to
work while under the influence of drugs); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees
Indep. Ass'n of E. Chicago, Inc., 790 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1986) (the public policy exception does not
require the arbitrator's award to violate positive law).
62.
W.R. Grace,461 U.S. at 766. This interpretation includes the situation where the collective
bargaining agreement itself violates public policy, and therefore, by enforcing the agreement, the
arbitrator's award would also violate public policy. See Westinghouse Hanford Corp. v. Hanford
Atomic Metal Trades Council, 39 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming the Ninth Circuit's narrow
interpretation in that the arbitrator's award did not violate public policy because the federal act
governing the parties was not violated).
63. United States Postal Serv. v. American Postal Workers Union, 736 F.2d 822 (Ist Cir. 1984).
64. 736 F.2d 822 (1st Cir. 1984).
65. Id. at 823.
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United States Postal Service did not have "just cause" to terminate the
employee.66 The arbitrator agreed, and ordered that the worker be 67
The Postal Service took the matter to the United States District Court of
Maine.68 After the District Court ruled in favor of the Postal Service, the Union
appealed to the First Circuit.69 The First Circuit ruled that the postal service did
7
not have to reinstate the employee because of the public policy exception. " The
court based its rationale on the importance of a postal worker's honesty because
of the faith the public has that the Postal Service will diligently care for its
mail.7' The court stated that it was not holding that a convicted criminal could
not be employed with the Postal Service, but that in this case public policy
dictated that the employee should not be reinstated.72
Contrary to the First Circuit, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia adopted the more narrow interpretation in a 1986 case with nearly
identical facts to United States Postal Service.73 In the District of Columbia
case, a postal worker was discharged for embezzling postal funds.7 4 However,
the arbitrator ordered the employee to be reinstated because the Postal Service
could show no "just cause" for discharging the employee absent the statements
illegally obtained by violating the Fifth Amendment.75 The court focused on the
fact that the parties bargained for the arbitration provision in the collective
the court did not have the authority to
bargaining agreement, and therefore,
76
judgment.
arbitrator's
the
overturn
The court interpreted the public policy exception to mean that an arbitrator's
award can only be overturned "if the award itself violates established law or seeks
to compel some unlawful action."77 The court read W.R. Grace as requiring the
exception to be narrowly applied "so as to limit potentially intrusive judicial
review of arbitration awards under the guise of public policy."78 The court held
that the arbitrator's award should be enforced because "there is no legal
proscription against the reinstatement" of an embezzler.79

66. Id.
67. Id. The arbitrator focused on the employee's intent and determined that the employee did
not intend to keep the money, but rather intended to repay it. Id. The arbitrator ruled that suspension
would have been an appropriate discipline. Id.
68. Id. at 824.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 825.
71.
Id.
72. Id.
73.
American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 789 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1986).
74. Id. at 3.
Id. The Fifth Amendment was violated in that incriminating statements were obtained from
75.
the employee before the employee was given Mirandawarnings. Id.
76. Id. at 6.
77. Id. at 8.
78. Id.
Id
79
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The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia applied a similar rationale
to a case with facts analogous to Exxon Shipping 11.80 In Northwest Airlines, Inc.
v. Air Line Pilots Association, International,a pilot was discharged due to an
alcohol-related incident. 8 Upon receiving treatment for his drinking problem,
the pilot was declared eligible to resume flying in 1984 by the Federal Aviation
Administration ("FAA"). 82 The Union took the matter to arbitration in 1985
seeking an offer of reinstatement for the employee."' During arbitration, the
employer was ordered to offer the pilot a reinstatement because alcoholism did not
constitute "just cause" in order to terminate the employee.84 The employer then
filed a complaint in district court attempting to have the arbitration award
overturned. 85
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that the public
policy exception applied in limited circumstances.86 The court was adamant that
the public policy must emanate from clear statutory or case law, and not from the
judge's own perceptions of the public interests.87
The court acknowledged the public policy of having commercial airlines
flown by sober pilots; however, it went on to hold that to overturn the arbitration
award would be to declare that the FAA erred in its recertification of the pilot.'s
Since the collective bargaining agreement was silent on what the employer was to
do in this situation, the court reasoned that it was not its place to step in and
determine what the parties would have agreed to; therefore, the arbitration award
was enforced.89
Due to the contradicting interpretations among the circuits, the public policy
exception made its way back to the United States Supreme Court in Misco.90
The Court did not expressly answer which interpretation was correct; however,
Misco inferred that the exception should be applied narrowly and emphasized the
great deference courts should give to labor arbitration. 9'
A Misco employee, Cooper, who operated dangerous machinery was
discharged after being caught with marijuana in the company parking lot. 92 The

80.
81.
within 24
82.
83.

Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 808 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Id. at 78. The employee was discharged when he was discovered piloting a company flight
hours after consuming alcohol. Id.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 78-79.

84.

Id. at 78.

85.

Id.

86.

Id.; see American Postal Workers Union, 789 F.2d at 8.

87.

Northwest Airlines, Inc., 808 F.2d at 83.

88.

Id.

89.

Id. at 83-84.

90.

Misco, 484 U.S. 29 (1987).

91.
Mouser, supra note 8, at
92.
Misco, 484 U.S. at 32-33.
was parked in the company parking
air and a lit marijuana cigarette was

101; see infra note 152.
Cooper was arrested when found in the back seat of his car which
lot. Id. at 33. The police noted that marijuana smoke was in the
found in the front seat ashtray. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1995/iss2/6
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Union argued that Misco did not have just cause to terminate Cooper, and the
arbitrator agreed.93 Misco then sought to vacate the arbitration award in district
court.94 The district court and the court of appeals both agreed with Misco that
Cooper should not be reinstated because doing so would violate the public policy
against operating dangerous machinery while under the influence of drugs or
alcohol. 95 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the
conflicting applications of this exception throughout the circuits.96
In Misco, the Court noted that two important points flowed from the WR.
Grace decision which applied the public policy exception to the enforcement of
a collective bargaining agreement: 1) a court will not enforce a collective
bargaining agreement if its specific terms violate public policy; and 2) this
decision does not authorize "broad judicial power to set aside arbitration awards
as against public policy."97 The Court went on to say that its decision depended
on "whether the award created any explicit conflict with other 'laws and legal
precedents' rather than an assessment of 'general considerations of supposed public
interests. "'
,
The Court's decision was admittedly made easier by the fact that neither the
district court nor the court of appeals sufficiently showed that public policy had
been violated in this case because the use of marijuana outside the workplace does
not necessarily mean that the employee would operate the machine while under the
influence of drugs or alcohol. 99 Additionally, the lower courts inadequately
demonstrated that this public policy existed outside general public considerations
and within existing laws or legal precedents.' ° Therefore, the Court ordered
that the employee should be reinstated pursuant the arbitration award.'
Since Misco left open the question as to the exact interpretation of the public
policy exception, courts have continued to disagree about its application. 0 2 In
1992, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that an arbitrator's award violated
a well-defined and dominant public policy against sexual harassment in the

93.

Id. at 33-34. The arbitrator based his determination on the fact that Misco did not prove

Cooper possessed or used marijuana on company property. Id.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 34.
Id. at 34-35.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 43.
Id. (quoting W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766).
Id. at 44.
Id.

101.
Id. at 45.
102.
Mouser, supra note 8, at 103. Misco is the most recent United States Supreme Court
decision to significantly discuss the issue. In the years after Misco, circuit courts have continued to
disagree on the exception's proper interpretation. See Westinghouse Hanford Corp. v. Hanford Atomic
Metal Trades Council, 39 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 1994); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. United Transp. Union,
3 F.3d 255 (8th Cir. 1993); Interstate Brands Corp. v. Chauffers, Local 135, 909 F.2d 885 (6th Cir.
1990) (interpreting the exception narrowly).
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workplace.' °3 In Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters,' °4 a Stroehmann employee, Leonard, violated a
Stroehmann rule against immoral conduct while on duty when he allegedly
5
sexually harassed an employee of one of Stroehmann's business clients.
Wiegand, the harassed employee, informed Leonard's superiors of the incident,
and as a result, Leonard was discharged.10 6 Leonard and the Union filed a
grievance, and the matter went to arbitration pursuant the collective bargaining
agreement. 0 7
The arbitrator did not determine whether the sexual harassment actually
occurred because Stroehmann's investigation was insufficient prior to the decision
to terminate Leonard.' 8 Hence, the arbitrator ordered Stroehmann to reinstate
Leonard. 9 Stroehmann challenged the action in district court where the
arbitration award was vacated because reinstating Leonard without a factual
finding on the allegations violates the public policy against sexual harassment in
the workplace." 0
On appeal, the Union argued that the district court erred in its application of
the public policy exception."' The district court set aside the award because the
arbitrator's means for arriving at the award violated public policy." 2 The
Union's position was that the award itself had to violate public policy before the
award could be vacated."' The court of appeals disagreed with the Union's
argument and agreed with the result in the district court." 4 The court of appeals
reasoned that a full reinstatement without regard to the merits of the allegations
would violate public policy against sexual harassment in the workplace." 5 This
interpretation is distinguishable from the district court's holding in that it did not
depend on the means used to arrive at the award as being what violated public
policy." 6 However, the court of appeals did agree that the arbitrator's award

Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436, 1438 (3d
103.
Cir. 1992).
104. 969 F.2d 1436 (3d Cir. 1992).
105. Id.
106.

Id. at 1438-39.

107.
108.

Id. at 1439-40.
Id. at 1440.

109.
110.

Id.
Id.

111.
112.

Id. at 1441.
Id.

113.

Id.

114.

Id. at 1444.

115. Id. The court believed that unless it was determined that no sexual harassment ever
occurred, reinstating Leonard would not discourage sexual harassment in the workplace. This is
because a person who may have committed sexual harassment would be permitted to return to his
position. Such a result would tend to undermine Stroehmann's ability to prevent immoral conduct in
the workplace. Id. at 1442.
116. Id. at 1444.
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should be overturned because it found that the arbitrator himself "was
unacceptably predisposed towards Leonard and against Stroehmann." ' 7
In 1993, the Third Circuit decided an analogous case to Exxon Shipping 11
involving the identical parties." 8 The incident arose when an Exxon oil tanker
ran aground and the helmsman, Foster, tested positive for marijuana.'
Exxon
proceeded to discharge Foster under its alcohol and drug policy, and the Union
proceeded to take its grievance to arbitration pursuant the collective bargaining
20
agreement.
The arbitration board determined that Foster did violate Exxon's drug policy.
However, it concluded that termination was an inappropriate sanction because
there was no evidence that Foster was impaired while on duty and the drug policy
2
did not mandate termination.'
' Exxon then moved the district court to set aside
22
1
the reinstatement award.
The district court vacated the award because reinstatement would undermine
23
the public policy of prohibiting drug users from operating commercial vessels.
The court of appeals was again faced with applying the public policy exception:
[A court] must enforce an arbitration award if it was based on an
"arguable" interpretation and/or application of the collective bargaining
agreement, and may only vacate it if there is no support in the record
for its determination or if it reflects a "manifest disregard of the
agreement, totally unsupported by principles of contract construction..
0124

In applying the exception, the court focused on the Misco standard which
provides that "... a court may refuse to enforce an award only when the award
itself violates a statute, regulation, or other manifestation of positive law, or
compels conduct by the employer that would violate such a law."' 25 Reasoning
through positive law, the court held that reinstating Foster would violate the public

117.

Id. at 1446.

The court made this conclusion about the arbitrator because of certain

comments the arbitrator made on record. Id. The arbitrator commented that Wiegand was overweight,
unattractive and that he doubted any average man would make a pass at such a woman. Id.
118.
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 993 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1993). This case
will be referred to as Exxon Shipping L

119.
120.

Id. at 358-59.
Id. at 359. This is the same alcohol and drug policy at issue in Exxon Shipping II. See

supra note 10.

121.

Id.

122.
123.

Id. at 360.
Id.

124.
125.

Id.
Id. at 363 (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 45 n.12). Although this standard appears to be

adopting the narrow interpretation, the court in Exxon Shipping I recognized the broad interpretation
as the better approach even though it did not acknowledge a bright-line separating the two. Id.
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The Union
policy against drug users operating commercial vessels.' 26
interpreted Misco to mean that such an award should be vacated only if the
arbitrator determined that the employee was likely to use drugs in the future.' 27
The court disagreed with this argument because it interpreted the Misco test to
depend on the specific public policy in question and not on a distinction between
the employee's past and future conduct.' 28
The court justified its ruling by emphasizing the importance of safety in the
operation of commercial vessels for the protection of the environment and general
public from a major oil spill.'29 The court distinguished the public policy
involved in Exxon Shipping I from the one in Misco by concluding that the
magnitude of potential harm is much greater in the operation of commercial
vessels than in the operation of a machine in which only the employee in the drugimpaired or alcohol-impaired condition is in danger. 30
IV. INSTANT DECISION

A. Majority Opinion
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis by acknowledging the
fact that in Misco, the United States Supreme Court did not have to adopt either
the broad or narrow interpretation of the public policy exception because the lower
court's decision did not attain the required threshold in W.R. Grace.'' Although
the public policy against drugs in the workplace was in issue, it was not
determined to be well-defined and dominant based on existing laws and
Furthermore, no violation of public policy was clearly shown in
precedents.'
court.'
lower
the
Since Misco did not settle the discrepancy as to the proper interpretation of
the public policy exception, the court in Exxon Shipping II had to rely on other

126. Id. at 364. The court did not decide whether the award had to violate positive law, or
merely the wrongful act had to be against public policy. Nonetheless, the court pointed to Coast Guard
regulations enacted to protect the public and the environment from negligent acts by drug or alcoholimpaired vessel operators. Id.
127. Id. at 365. This is because if the employee was found to have been rehabilitated, then there
is no reason to refuse employment; whereas if the employee can be expected to use drugs again, then
there would be a strong public interest in preventing a potential disaster if that employee operates a
vessel while in an impaired condition. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 367.
130. Id.
131.
Eoxon Shipping II, 11 F.3d at 1192.
132. Id.
133.
Id.
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' The court noted that in Stroehmann Bakeries and
precedent and existing laws. 34
Exxon Shipping I, the Third Circuit rejected the argument that the exception can
only be applied if enforcing the arbitrator's award would violate a well-defined
35
and dominant public policy imbedded in laws and legal precedents. 1
In Exxon Shipping I, the Third Circuit embraced a broad interpretation of the
exception ruling that an arbitration award reinstating an employee may be vacated
if the award is "inconsistent with some significant public policy."' 3 6 The public
policy at issue in both Exxon Shipping I and Exxon Shipping II is the prevention
of "the operation of a vessel under the influence of drugs or alcohol.' 37 In
Exxon Shipping I, the court based its decision on the magnitude of potential harm
caused by an oil tanker disaster, as distinguished from cases in which arbitration
awards survived public policy challenges. 13 In the present decision, the court
also cited other circuits applying similar interpretations to the public policy

exception. 39

In Exxon Shipping H1, the court was extremely concerned with the potential
danger that this public policy seeks to prevent, in particular, the effects on the
environment of a major oil spill. 4 ° The court pointed to the Clean Water
Act14 and the Oil Pollution Act 4 ' to establish that Congress has expressly3
promulgated restrictions and penalties for the wrongful discharge of oil."
These acts provide for the liabilities and penalties imposed on the owner or

134. Id. The court then tried to meet the W.R. Grace threshold by finding a violation of a welldefined and dominant public policy based on existing laws and precedents. Id. The court avoided the
relevant dicta set out in Misco which provided that the arbitration award should be enforced if the
arbitrator arguably applied the contract within the scope of authority. See infra note 155. The court
also seemed to ignore the issue of undermining alternative dispute resolution by giving the courts final
say on arbitration awards. See supra note 35.
135. Id. The court is implying that the Third Circuit has rejected the narrow, and thus, has
adopted the broad interpretation. Id. This was accomplished in StroehnannBakeries by vacating an
arbitration award contrary to the public policy of preventing sexual harassment in the workplace,
without identifying any law making it illegal to reinstate an employee accused of such conduct. Id.
136. Id. (quoting Exxon Shipping 1, 993 F.2d at 363).
137. Id. at 1193. (quoting Exxon Shipping I, 993 F.2d at 362).
138. Id. For example, the court noted that the potential danger in the oil tanker cases was much
more severe than the possible harm to the employee in Misco. Id.
139. Id. at 1193-94.; see Gulf Coast Indus. Workers Union v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 991 F.2d 244,
257 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 441 (1993) (affg order vacating arbitration award that required
reinstatement of refinery worker who tested positive for drugs); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots
Ass'n Int'l, 861 F.2d 665, 674-75 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871 (1989) (vacating
arbitration award that reinstated a pilot who flew while intoxicated); Iowa Elec. Light & Power v.
Local Union 204, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 834 F.2d 1424, 1430 (8th Cir. 1987) (refusing to
reinstate nuclear power plant employee who committed serious violation).
140. Id. at 1193-94.
141.
33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993).
142.
33 U.S.C. § 2702 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993).
143. Exxon Shipping II, 11 F.3d at 1194. Under federal and state law, the owner or operator
of an oil tanker that causes an oil spill may be civilly and criminally liable. Id.
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Additionally, the court noted the
operator of a tanker causing an oil spill.'
Senate Report on the Oil Pollution Act which discussed the public interest in
individuals being responsible for the safe operation of vessels to avoid the
influence of alcohol while on duty and the Senate conclusion that alcohol use
among seamen is currently a serious problem. 4 The court also recognized that
civil or criminal actions to punish crew members
Coast Guard regulations may use
46
if intoxicated while on duty.'
However, the court conceded that there is no statute or regulation which
prohibits the owner of an oil tanker from employing an individual who has
previously been found intoxicated while operating an oil tanker. 47 However,
the court reasoned that continuing to employ4 such an individual may constitute
gross negligence on the part of an employer. 1
Upon review of Exxon Shipping I" and the aforementioned statutes,
regulations and congressional manifestations, the court concluded that the public
policy in question is well-defined and dominant, emanating directly from laws and
legal precedents and not from general public considerations."' While
acknowledging that arbitration is the preferable method of settling labor disputes,
the court held that the arbitration award should be vacated because of the proper
application of the public policy exception."'
B. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Seitz dissented relying on Kane Gas Light & Heating Co. v.
InternationalBrotherhoodof Firemen & Oilers, Local 112."2 Judge Seitz noted
that Kane Gas adopted the position that an arbitration award should be enforced
unless the award requires illegal acts to be perfonned."' The dissent believed
that the rule in Kane Gas is equally applicable to Exxon Shipping II and if the rule
4
was to be rejected, it could only be done so by an en banc court.

144.

Id. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1321, 2702, 2704 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993).

145.

Id. (citing S. REP. No. 99, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1990)).

146.
147.

Id. at 1195.
Id.

148.

Id. Furthermore, continued employment of a seaman with a history of drug and alcohol

abuse could constitute criminal liability to Exxon Shipping for "the employment of crew members who
were allegedly 'incompetent' or 'physically or mentally incapable' of performing their duties." Id, see
33 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(1) (1988) and 33 C.F.R. § 164.11(b) (1993).
149. See supranotes 137-38 and accompanying text.
150.
151.

Exxon Shipping II, 11 F.3d at 1196.
Id.

687 F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983).
152.
Exron Shipping II, 11 F.3d at 1196; see Kane Gas, 687 F.2d at 682. This position parallels
153.
the narrow interpretation of the public policy exception, although it should be noted that Kane Gas was
decided before W.R. Grace first adopted the exception into the arbitration realm. Id.
Erxon Shipping II,11 F.3d at 1196.
154.
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V.

COMMENT

While it seems the decision in Exxon Shipping II is correct, the public policy
exception has a profound effect on alternative dispute resolution.'" The goals
of arbitration are undermined when a court steps in and determines that the
arbitrator incorrectly resolved the dispute between an employer and employee."5 6
There exists three distinct standards which promote the policy of the
judiciary's deference to arbitration: 1) arbitration is final and binding; 1' 2) if
the collective bargaining agreement or the arbitration award violates public policy,
a court may then vacate the award;' 58 and 3) if public policy is at issue, then a
court may determine how the dispute shall be resolved.' 59 The United States
Supreme Court has rejected the argument that absolute finality should be a
characteristic of arbitration. 6 ° However, although the Court's dicta implies the
second standard, it has explicitly refused to adopt either the broad or narrow
interpretations.' 6' This gives each individual circuit too much discretion in
interpreting the public policy exception.
A. The Court's Analysis
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals properly complied with precedent
established in Stroehmann Bakeries and Exxon Shipping I by adopting the broad

155. The outcome seems correct because the court was consistent with prior Third Circuit
decisions. See Exxon Shipping, 801 F. Supp. at 1444. Furthermore, there is no dispute that Fris was
in an impaired condition while on duty which may have placed the environment and the public at a
greater risk of disaster. Exon Shipping II, 11 F.3d at 1191. Therefore, dismissing Fris from his duties
would prevent Fris from putting the public at risk again and serve as a deterrent to other employees
to keep them from becoming involved in a similar situation in the future.
156. See supra note 42.
157. This was the standard provided for in the collective bargaining agreement between Exxon
Shipping and the Union, with no mention of the public policy exception or judicial intervention. See
Exxon Shipping II, 11 F.3d at 1190.
158. This standard amounts to the narrow interpretation of the public policy exception because
an arbitration award will not itself violate public policy unless: 1) the contract the arbitrator is
interpreting is contrary to public policy; or 2) the arbitrator acts negligently by misinterpreting the
contract resulting in a public policy violation. See supra note 68.
159. In essence, this is what results under the broad interpretation of the public policy exception
because in cases applying the broad interpretation, the arbitration award is vacated if the court
determines that a well-defined and dominant public policy has been violated. See supra note 61.
160. See generally United Paperworkers Irit'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29 (1987);
W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 757, 766-67.
161.
See Misco, 484 U.S. at 38. "[Als long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or
applying the contract and acting within the scope of authority, that a court is convinced he committed
serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision." Id. The contract in Exxon Shipping Hallowed
the arbitration panel discretion on whether or not Fris' conduct constituted grounds for dismissal.
Exxon Shipping II, 11 F.3d at 1190. Therefore, under the language of Misco, the only way the
arbitration award should have been set aside is if the arbitration panel exceeded the scope of its
authority. Id.
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interpretation of the public policy exception. 6 2 However, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals has misapplied Msco.
The Misco Court determined that the arbitration award should be enforced
because the lower courts did not prove that a well-defined and dominant public
policy was violated. 163 As a result, the Court did not have to adopt either the
broad or narrow interpretation. 64 Since the outcome of Exxon Shipping II rested
on the proper interpretation, the court probably should have recognized the
assertive dicta in Misco favoring the narrow interpretation. 61 In Exxon Shipping
II, the arbitration panel applied the collective bargaining agreement to Fris'
conduct and determined that reinstatement after a ninety-day suspension was the
proper remedy. 6 6 The alcohol and drug policy did not mandate termination;
therefore, it appears as though the panel arguably construed the agreement while
acting within the scope of its authority. Under this standard, the arbitration award
should have been enforced.
B. Conflicting Policies
In order to determine which standard is in society's best interest, the
competing policies must be balanced. One significant policy is the finality of
arbitration. 67 Although it is still a somewhat rare occurrence, an increasing
number of arbitration awards are being vacated by the judiciary under the public
policy exception. 68 Interpreting the exception broadly and allowing judicial
intervention could result in a limitless expansion of the exception in which the
awards hold minimum weight with regard to public policy.' 69 Additionally,
collective bargaining agreements would become more difficult to draft because of
the possibility that parties would lose faith in the arbitration process. 7 Further,
such an interpretation detracts from parties' rights to negotiate an agreement, while
simultaneously being governed by a judge with less expertise in labor law than a
specialized arbitrator.'
These issues are best served by the narrow
interpretation because it provides a stricter threshold for courts to vacate an
arbitration award. Thus, more disputes would be finalized at the arbitration phase,
which was the process chosen by the parties.
Another important policy is the rights of the aggrieved employee. Applying
the broad interpretation will result in an increasing number of discharged

162.
Int'l Bhd.
163.
164.

See generallyExxon Shipping II, 993 F.2d 357; Stroehmann Bakeries Inc. v. Local 776,
of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436 (3d. Cir. 1992).
See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
Mouser, supra note 8, at 102-103.

165.
166.
167.

See supra note 161.
Exxon Shipping 17, 11 F.3d at 1191.
Mouser, supra note 8, at 121.

168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id. at 122-23.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 124-25.
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employees from being reinstated if the employee's conduct was contrary to public
policy.'
The public may then perceive the employee as being incapable of
doing adequate work, thus minimizing the likelihood of the employee finding other
employment. 1'
Another way a discharged employee might be aggrieved can be explained in
the criminal context.'74 If the public policy violated is punished by a criminal
statute, then the employee will be punished twice -- once for breaking the law and
once by the employer.' 75 This violates the intent of the legislature because the
legislature provides for maximum punishment in the statute, and if the employee
is also punished by the employer, the employee is in effect given a greater
punishment than the legislature intended.' 76
The aforementioned policies are countered by the significant policy in
promoting safety and protecting the environment from disaster caused by workers
under the influence of drugs and alcohol.'
The cases have shown that a court
will likely allow an employee to be reinstated if the wrongful act did not pose
significant danger to the public, but a court will not enforce an award reinstating
an employee who threatened public safety or the environment.7 8 Terminating
dangerous workers will deter other employees from committing similar wrongful
acts. This policy is more effectively advanced by the broad interpretation because
it allows the courts to intervene into the labor arena and apply the concerns of
society based on public policy.
However, arbitrators are similarly capable of weighing the public concern
with the legal implications of enforcing the collective bargaining agreement.
Furthermore, employers can achieve the same deterrence effect by mandating
termination in the collective bargaining agreement for conduct which violates
public policy and threatens public safety or the environment.

172.

Id. at 121.

173. Id. Exxon Shipping II is an example of the dilemma persisting under the broad
interpretation. The employee did not have an opportunity to prove that his conduct would not happen
again, nor did the employer provide any rehabilitation or treatment. Exxon Shipping II, 11 F.3d at
1191.

As a result, it is doubtful that Fris will ever work as a seaman again.

174.

Mouser, supra note 8, at 120.

175.
176.

Id.
Id.

177.

Eron Shipping II, It F.3d at 1193.

178.
To illustrate, the employee in Misco did not risk harm to anyone except himself and the
Court allowed him to be reinstated. See Misco, supranotes 90-101 and accompanying text. In contrast,

the threatened harm was much more severe in the Exxon Shipping cases, and both employees'
reinstatements were disallowed. See supra notes 117-151 and accompanying text.
179.

Mouser, supra note 8, at 126.
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CONCLUSION

Unfortunately, situations arise which make it impractical for an arbitrator to
simply look at the collective bargaining agreement to resolve an employment
dispute. 8 ' Due to public policy concerns, it is necessary to consider public
interests as well as private contractual ones. 8' At a minimum, employer and
employee representatives deserve uniformity in the application of the public policy
exception. Furthermore, the courts should give deference to the arbitrator's
decision as indicated by the United States Supreme Court.' 82 Employers and
labor unions contract for arbitration, and if they so decide, they can draft
collective bargaining agreements which provide for public policy situations. If
they do not, the arbitrator's decision should stand as long as the agreement being
enforced does not violate public policy.
TODD M. SIEGEL

180.
Timothy J. Heinsz, JudicialReview ofLabor Arbitration Awards: The Enterprise Wheel
Goes Around andAround, 52 Mo. L. REv. 243 (1987).
181.
Id.
182. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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